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ABSTRACT
This article demonstrates why the procedures used in previous
studies do not permit inference about the relationship between interest
rates and taxes. We present a model that leads to direct estimates of the
degree to which interest rates respond to changes in tax rates. The
empirical results imply that the adjustment of taxable interest rates has
been large enough to render after-tax yields impervious to tax rate
changes. Further, tax-exempt yields are unaffected by changes in tax
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Michael Darby (1975) and Martin S. Feldstein (1976) have suggested
that, in the presence of income taxation, nominal interest rates would have
to change by more than expected inflation to preserve expected after-tax
real interest rates. The frequent empirical rejection of this hypothesis has
often been attributed to the failure of interest rates to allow for interest
income taxation.., a characteristic Vito Tanzi (1980) has termed "fiscal illu-
sion".1 Here we investigate the degree of fiscal illusion by directly esti-
mating the response of nominal interest rates to changes in tax rates.
After deriving the reduced form for the interest rate in Section I, we
demonstrate the difficulty in drawing inferences about fiscal illusion from
existing estimates. In Section III, we present direct estimates of the extent
of fiscal illusion. Section IV concludes.
I.The Model
The macromodel we use is similar to that of Joe Peek and James A.
Wilcox (1983), augmented with a fiscal illusion parameter. The IS, LM,
wage, and aggregate supply relations (deflated by N) can be expressed
as:
(1) - = a0 - a1r* + a2Y + a3(X - N) + a4(M -- - a5SS -
a6 F B
(2) M -- b0 + b1(Y -N) -b2i* - b3FB
(3) W = c0 + e - c1SS
(4)P = d0 + W + d1(Y - N) + d2SS,
where the coefficients of all the variables are positive, x, M, P,
and W are real output, natural (i.e., potential) real output, the sum of
1real exports and real government expenditures, the nominal money supply,
the price level, the expected price level, and the nominal wage, respective-
ly (all in logs). Y is the percentage change in actual real output lagged
one period, SS is a supply shock variable, FB is the domestic bonds held
by foreigners, and r* and F4 are tax-adjusted real and nominal interest
rates. The nominal interest rate (I) is related to i and r* by (5) and (6):
(5) i (1 — Ot)i
(6) r*Ei*_pe
- . . e. where t is the marginal tax rate on interest income, p is the anticipated
inflation rate, and 0 is the fiscal illusion parameter. A value of unity for 0
implies that agents respond to after-tax, rather than pre-tax, interest rates
and therefore do not suffer from fiscal illusion. A value for 0 of zero, at
the other end of the presumed range for this parameter, would imply that
agents disregard taxes entirely, i.e., suffer from complete fiscal illusion.
Real expenditures depend on the real interest rate after allowance for
taxes and for the degree of fiscal illusion, real exogenous export and gov-
ernment demand, a real balance effect, and an investment accelerator term.
The opportunity cost of holding money is the tax-adjusted nominal interest
rate. The wage and price equations embody the natural rate hypothesis.
A supply shock, e.g., a sudden increase in the relative price of imported
oil, lowers the IS curve through its effect on the demand for capital, and
hence investment demand (see Wilcox (1983b)), shifts the aggregate supply
equation by raising the cost of production, and reduces the equilibrium real
wage. The FB variable is included to isolate the financial effects arising
from the supply shocks. In the IS curve, FB serves as a proxy for any
increase in the world saving rate that developed as real income was trans-
ferred tocountries (OPEC) with higher saving propensities. Similarly, FB






money will be reduced as wealth is transferred to agents who desire a
wealth portfolio with a much higher proportion of U.S. government securi-
ties than domestic wealth-holders do.






e N N where M and X are (M - p - V ) and (X - V ), respectively, and a
over a variable indicates that it has been divided by (1-Ut). The liquidity
and real balance effects of an increase in the real money supply have
offsetting effects on the interest rate resulting in an ambiguous sign for
A2. Likewise, the sign of A5 is indeterminate a priori.2




Equation (8) highlights the fact that very little can be deduced about the
presence or strength of tax effects on interest rates from estimates of
To test for the presence of tax effects, we disentangle the tax (1-Ut) and
non-tax (A1) terms that comprise . We take the Darby hypothesis to be
that 1/(1-t). Equivalently, this is the joint hypothesis that A1 = 1 and
o = 1. We distinguish this from the simple hypothesis that 01, the
"complete tax adjustment" or "absence of fiscal illusion" hypothesis. This
hypothesi asserts only that individuals base their behavior on after-tax
interest rates. An even less restrictive version of this hypothesis would bethat tax rates are not completely ignored: 0 > 0.
Clearly, the existence of fiscal illusion (0 K 1) would imply rejection of
the Darby hypothesis. Rejection of the joint Darby hypothesis, however,
does not necessarily imply rejection of the hypothesis of complete tax adjust-
ment (0 = 1). Nor does the finding that 0 = 1 imply that the Darby hypo-
thesis holds, since A1 will be less than unity, for example, if either the IS
curve is horizontal or the LM curve is vertical (see(8)).
II.Previous Tests for Tax Effects
Early tests of the Darby hypothesis (e.g., Thomas F. Cargill (1977),
John A. Carlson (1976), Jack Carr, James E. Pesando, and Lawrence B.
Smith (1976)) estimated reduced-form nominal interest rate equations where
tax effects remained embedded in the reduced-form coefficient, 13.That
hypothesis did not receive much empirical support.4 Tanzi (1980) did
separate 13 into its tax and non-tax components, employing Pe/(l_) as an
explanatory variable. He rejected the hypothesis that the coefficient on
this variable (our A1) was unity and concluded that people suffered from
fiscal illusion.From (8), however, we see that this procedure assumes 0 =
1 (i.e., the absence of fiscal illusion) and tests whetherA1 differs from
unity, thereby precluding estimates of, tests for, or conclusions about the
extent to which interest rates react to changes in tax rates.
Michael Melvin (1982) recognizes this difficulty.Using structural
parameter estimates for a small macromodel similar to the one we presented
in Section I, he obtains a value of 0.511 for A1. This estimate, however,
is conditioned on U1. Although Tanzi and Melvin obtain similar estimates,
Melvin correctly notes that a coefficient below unity does not impLy that
4taxes are ignored. On the other hand, his estimates do not imply that
there are tax effects.
In another recent Review article, Robert Ayanian (1983) proposes an
alternative test of the Darby hypothesis. His regression of the taxable on
the tax-exempt yield provides a coefficient of 1.63 (s.e. = 0.04). He
interprets this as an estimate of 1/(1-t) and concludes that there is "an
unmistakable Darby effect" (p. 763). Although the spread between taxable
and tax-exempt yields almost certainly reflects tax rates (and is, in fact,
often used to obtain a proxy for them (see Darby (1975)), Ayanian's results
do not indicate "whether or not the expected real rate was depressed by
expectations of inflation" (p. 764), whether the taxable rate rises with
taxes, whether the tax-exempt rate is invariant to tax rate changes, or
whether the spread has responded to tax rate changes.
Using Davidson-MacKinnon (1981) model specification tests, Peek (1982)
and Peek and Wilcox (1983) were able to distinguish between the
tax-adjusted and non-tax-adjusted Fisher hypotheses. Faced with a choice
between the two extremes of complete tax adjustment (01) and complete
fiscal illusion (0 = 0), these tests implied the rejection of complete fiscal
illusion and failure to reject the complete tax adjustment hypothesis. Al-
though these conclusions are not based on 0-conditioned estimates of A1,
they provide no estimate of the degree of fiscal illusion.
Ill. Direct Estimates of the Degree of Fiscal Illusion
We obtain a direct estimate of the degree of fiscal illusion, 0, by non-
linear least squares estimation of (7). Table 1 presents the results. The
estimates are based on semiannual monthly observations (June and Decem-
ber) to match the Livingston survey data. The sample extends from June
51952 through June 1979. This sample period avoids the pre-1952 pegging of
interest rates by the Federal Reserve, the imposition of credit controls in
1980, and any structural changes associated with financial deregulation and
monetary policy after June 1979. Monthly averages of the one-year Trea-
sury bill bond-equivalent yield during June and December are used as the
before-tax nominal interest rate measure (i) to match the maturity of the
Livingston one-year anticipated inflation rate data.
The anticipated inflation rate series, PE, is the percentage change in
the CPI expected over the next twelve months derived from the Livingston
survey. This series was provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Phila-
delphia. This measure of anticipated inflation has two advantages:it is a
truly ex ante expectation and reflects whatever sophistication agents use to
process information.
Second and fourth quarter observations are used for the remaining ex-
planatory variables. The logarithm of the sum of real exports and real
government expenditures on goods and services divided by the level of
natural real output (X') and the percentage change in real GNP lagged one
period (iY) are constructed from the National Income and Product Accounts
data. We use the potential real GNP series constructed by the Council of
Economic Advisors as our measure of natural real output. The logarithm of
the nominal money supply deflated by the expected price level and natural
real output (M') is constructed using the Ml definition of the money supply
and the Livingston survey measure of the expected price level. The tax
rate (t), the supply shock variable (SS), and the foreign holdings of bonds
(FB) are described in detail in Peek and Wilcox (1983). The tax rate is
calculated as a weighted average of the marginal personal income tax rate
for each adjusted gross income class.5 SS is measured by the ratio of theimplicit price deflator for imports to the GNP deflator adjusted for exchange
rate changes. FB is the ratio of foreign holdings to the sum of private
domestic and foreign holdings of U.S. government short-term marketable
securities.
Column 1 is obtained when (7) is estimated under the constraint that
interest rates adjust completely to changes in tax rates (01). The estima-
tion method is ordinary least squares.Expected inflation, exogenous
expenditures, the change in real income, supply shocks, and foreign de-
mand for bonds each enter significantly. Column 2 allows for a freely-
estimated fiscal illusion term, 0. The point estimate of 1.40 is insignifi-
cantly different from one. This estimate suggests that the adjustment to
tax rate changes is complete: pre-tax interest rates rise by enough to
preserve after-tax yields. Further, we can easily reject the hypothesis of
complete fiscal illusion (0=0).6
Columns 3 and 4 substitute alternative expected inflation measures,
PEIN and PEOUT, for the Livingston survey measure, PE. PEIN and
PEOUT are in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts based on information
contained in earlier Treasury bill yields.7 Using monthly data, inflation
(twelve times the month over month change in the log of the CPI) is re-
gressed on a constant and six lags of the one-month Treasury bill yield.
PEIN is the vector of fitted values for June and December obtained using
the entire 1952:06-1979:06 sample. The out-of-sample forecasts, PEOUT,
are based only on prior information. Thus, the forecast during June
depends on the six monthly-average Treasury yields from December to May
and the forecast equation coefficients. These coefficients are obtained by
regressing inflation on a constant and six lags of one-month Treasury
yields over the forty-eight months ending two months before the forecast is
/made. Using coefficient estimates from a sample that edged closer to the
forecast dates (June and December) would require more information than
agents actually had. Most of the coefficients, especially those on the ex-
pected inflation measures themselves, are affected by this substitution.
The estimates of the tax-adjustment parameter, 0, however, are virtually
unchanged. Thus, the finding that interest rates respond completely to
changes in tax rates is robust with respect to the measure of expected
inflation.
Column 5 replaces the taxable Treasury bill yield with the one-year
tax-exempt municipal bond yield, i, obtained from Salomon Brothers
Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads.If after-tax yields are
tax-invariant as indicated by column 2, we would expect tax-exempt yields
to not respond to tax rate changes. The estimate for 0 of -0.26, which is
insignificantly different from zero, implies that those yields are hardly
affected by taxes. Since our model does not indicate the appropriate speci-
fication for testing the effects of tax rates on tax-exempt yields, two addi-
tional forms were also estimated. Setting 0 equal to zero, we re-estimated
column 5 once adding t and once adding 1/(1-t) as explanatory variables.
Their coefficients were 1.17 and 0.69 with t-statistics of 0.74 and 0.27,
respectively. Thus changes in tax rates leave after-tax yields unaffected.
IV. Conclusion
We have argued that previous studies have not produced tests that
permit inference about either the presence or the degree of fiscal illusion in
interest rate determination. The specification we use allows us to estimate
directly the extent to which interest rates adjust to changes in tax rates.
The estinmtes based on taxable and on tax-exempt yields and on various
measures of expected inflation imply that after-tax real yields are invariant
0with respect to tax rate changes. Thus, these results do not suggest
there has been fiscal illusion.
9TABLE 1
Reduced From Estimates for interest rates
1952:06-1979:06, Semi-annual Observations
(absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 14.2 12.2 2.4 5.7 12.4
(4.92)(3.81)(1.25)(1.93)(2.22)






M.' 1.94 1.48 -1.12 -3.91 2.06
(1.62)(1.36)(1.86)(2.95)(1.32)
X' 3.93 3.37 0.75 5.06 3.32
(2.16)(2.05)(0.51) (2.05)(1.52)
7.00 5.47 3.64 5.33 2.51
(2.65)(2.05)(1.70)(1.43)(0.88)
SS -3.22 -2.94 -1.26 -2.64 -2.55
(5.99) (5.55) (3.08) (3.84) (2.88)
FB -4.68 -4.03 -1.10 -2.03 -4.84
(2.55) (2.47) (0.80) (1.03) (2.02)
0 1.40 1.34 1.33 0.26
(3.57) (3.77) (2.21) (0.19)
R2 .909 .910 .931 .856 .851
DW 1.64 1.66 2.21 1.39 1.82
SEE 0.730 0.733 0.639 0.925 0.525
Not: Data and sources are given in text.
1 C)11
RE FE R EN C ES
Ayanian, Robert, "Expectations, Taxes, and Interest: The Search for the
Darby Effect," American Economic Review, September 1983, 73, 762- 65.
Cargill, Thomas F.,"Direct Evidence of the Darby Hypothesis for the
UnitedStates," Economic Inquiry, January 1977, 15, 132-134.
__________________andMeyer, Robert A., "The Term Structure of Infla-
tionary Expectations and Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, March
1980, 35, 57-70.
Carlson, John A., "Expected Inflation and Interest Rates," Economic Inquiry,
October 1979, 17, 597-608.
Carr, Jack, Pesando, James E., and Smith, Lawrence B., "Tax Effects, Price
Expectations and the Nominal Rate of Interest," Economic Inquiry, June
1976, 14, 259-269.
Darby, Michael R., "The Financial and Tax Effects of Monetary Policy on In-
terest Rates," Economic Inquiry, June 1975, 14, 266-76.
Davidson, Russell and MacKinnon, James G., "Several Tests for Model Specifica-
tion in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses," Econometrica, May 1981,
49,781-93.
Fama,Eugene F. and Gibbons, Michael R., "A Comparison of Inflation Forecasts,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
Feldstein, Martin S., "Inflation, Income Taxes, and the Rate of Interest: A
Theoretical Analysis," American Economic Review, December 1976, 66,
809-20.
Levi, Maurice D. and Makin, John H., "Anticipated Inflation and Interest Rates:
Further Interpretation of Findings on the Fisher Equation," American
nomi Review, December 1978, 68, 801-12.12
Melvin, Michael, "Expected Inflation, Taxation, and Interest Rates: The Delu-
sion of Fiscal Illusion," American Economic Review, September 1982, 72,
841-45.
Peek, Joe, "Interest Rates, Income Taxes, and Anticipated Inflation," American
Economic Review, December 1982, 72, 980-91.
__________and Wilcox, James A., "The Postwar Stability of the Fisher Effect,"
Journal of Finance, September 1983, 38, 1111-1124.
Salomon Brothers Inc., Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads, New York.
Tanzi, Vito, "Inflationary Expectations, Economic Activity, Taxes, and Interest
Rates," American Economic Review, March 1980, 70, 12-21.
Wilcox, James A., "The Effects of Inflation Uncertainty and Supply Shocks on
Real Interest Rates," Economics Letters, 1983a, 12, 163-167.
__________"Why Real Interest Rates Were So Low in the 1970s," American
Economic Review, March 1983b, 73, 44-53.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, The National
Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-76 Statistical
Tables. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, September 1981.
_________Bureau of Economic Analysis, The Survey of Current Business,
Washington, D.C.: USGPO, various Issues through July 1982.13
FOOTNOTES
*Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167,
and School of Business Administration, 350 Barrows Hall, University of
California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720. We are grateful to Eugene
Fama, Richard Meese, Jeffrey Skelton, Janet Yellen and two anonymous
referees for this Review for their comments. Josef Chytry provided fast
and accurate typing. Any errors are solely our responsibility.Financial
support was provided by a Boston College Summer Research Fellowship
and NSF grant SES-8109093.
1.We feel that a more accurate term for this characteristic would be "tax
ilIusion.' Since it has already become widely known as "fiscal illusion,"
we will use this latter term.
2.The investment-real wage effects of supply shocks might be expected to
dominate, suggesting a negative value for A5. The results presented in
Wilcox (1983a, 1983b) and Peek and Wilcox (1983) can be so interpreted.
3.Thishas been pointed out by Levi and Makin (1978),Melvin(1982),and
Peek(1982).
4.Cargilland Meyer (1980)foundsignificantly greater than unity estimates
forthe 1960s, but they disappeared when the sample period was extended
into the 1970s. Wilcox (1983b) suggested a cause for this coefficient decline.14
5.For the June observations we use the tax rate for that calendar year. For
the December observations we use the average of the tax rates for the cur-
rent year and for the upcoming year.
6.These point estimates differ somewhat from Peek and Wilcox (1983) due to
minor data revisions and because here the dependent variable is calculated
as the bond-equivalent yield as opposed to a discount factor. The results
are not sensitive to the choice of yields. When the interest rate is calculated
on a discount basis, the estimated value of 8 is 1.23 (t = 2.65).
7.Fama and Gibbons (forthcoming) argue that forecasts based on interest
rates may be superior to survey forecasts.